

# CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MYANMAR'S DEMOCRATIZATION

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## **Abstract**

The promotion of democratizing in Myanmar has become the main dominant theme in current situation. How to facilitate democratization process is very important for Myanmar. Myanmar democratization efforts encountered many pitfalls, contradictions and dilemmas. In the era of regime transformation, Civil and political societies are sharing common with the government are essential for societal problem. My project aimed to facilitate democratic path and nurture political culture in accordance with current situations. Myanmar is embarking on political reforms that could prove to be the first stage of gradual transition to Democracy. There is a matter of uncertainties on Myanmar's political horizon, well understood by analysts but paid limited attention in much democratic talks. These functions, in turn, play different roles in democratization: developing citizenship, shaping the public agenda, or changing institutions through collective action. Strengthening state institution alone will ensure the rule of law or control of corruption for an effective reform strategy also requires strengthen the capacity of professional & civil association, think tanks, the mass media and independent interest groups. This Research will highlight the challenges for improvement in the human rights situation and substantive progress towards an inclusive democratization process. Why did Myanmar's democratization process get slow? How did government and opposition party find a way out the facilitate our democratization.

key words: **democratization, rule of law, regime transformation, reform strategy**

## **Introduction**

The new government of Myanmar president U Htin Kyaw's the first President speech, the new government of Myanmar will implement the following processes:

Reconciliation

Internal Peace

Emergence of new constitution effectuation of democratic, federal state

The new government is responsible to emerge the new constitution of Democratic federal state of Myanmar. If the new constitution is created the right of minority existence in Myanmar. Constitutions ( 1947, 1974, 2008) of Myanmar give equal rights and protection of all citizens. It protect the right of all citizens e.g Equal treatment of all ethnic groups , freedom of religion

and freedom of education. logic explaining the transition from a direct rule order set up thereafter for the then highlights the most encouraging political, and economic reforms initiated by the post-junta executive and new legislative powers, return of Aung San Suu Kyi to the forefront of politics resurgence of parliament, among others. Yet despite these positive signs, Myanmar's road to democratic change, sustainable development, peace, and national reconciliation is still paved with daunting obstacles them are the continuing military politics and the preserves the armed forces have secured in the 2008 Constitution; political, bureaucratic, and economic clientelism at all levels of Myanmar society society, which tends to slow down liberalization and modernization reforms; as well as the enduring concerns about the political relationships and sharing of resources between a ethnic majority and a myriad of ethnic and religious minorities scattered throughout conclusions are drawn on the prospects for evolution for the "transitional" quasi the SPDC and for a meaningful and sustainable democratic change.

### **National Reconciliations**

SLORC had officially been founded with the aim of pacifying the scene, which was shaken up by the student and pro-democracy uprising that precipitated collapse of the BSPP Socratic rule, as renewed ethnic rebellions in the country's periphery. The mission the Tatmadaw assigned itself in 1988, as an interventionist "praetorian" ruler (Egreteau,2013, 20-30). In doing so, the army was in a position to resist international pressure as well as internal demands for change and to ensure the continuity of political transitional moment, although the willingness of a few Myanmar military leaders to see Embarrassment resulting from Western policies of ostracism and economic sanctions imposed in combined with extreme frustration with neighboring China's deep entrenchment and penetration of the Myanmar economy since the late 1980s, seem China's influence and activities in the region has been observed since independence, not only since Beijing became the quasi-undisputed patron of the SLORC-SPDC- indeed, three years after the start of the transition, Chinese investors and entrepreneurs were still dominating large parts of the on their side, foreign and Western investors have gradually attempted to reenter Myanmar's national economy, especially since 2012 and the (almost complete) lifting sanctions; but most have been facing severe challenges. This does not reflect an on the part of the new Myanmar military elites to see the Western liberal country to checkmate the Chinese influence.

Years of boycotts and head-on opposition to the powers that be of the moment, the NLD ultimately chose to play the game of electoral participation. Candidacy to the rural constituency. Despite the relatively improved conditions since 2011, the sustainability of the post-SPDC transition and democratic consolidation still faces formidable challenges. Among them, two constitute a major impediment to a meaningful democratization process in Myanmar: (1) the continuing policy role of the military and the depth of army intrusion into civilian affairs and global decision-making unreachable national reconciliation much-fragmented and divided Myanmar society the still has to learn how to live together

All future scenarios for the democratization and stability of the country will necessitate a thorough address of Myanmar's ethnic question matter of sharing political and economic resources between the Myanmar majority (about two-thirds of the 51.5 million-strong Myanmar's population), temptations, and the ethnic minorities violent conflicts and disputes unresolved since the country won independence 2008 Constitution time some ethnic grievances, including freedom decentralized representation bodies. But in the seven "ethnic" states and the seven Myanmar-dominated regions, the separation of powers between the new executive entities led by a Chief Minister who is appointed by the central authorities, and the legislative bodies is guaranteed proposals for more devolution of power being submitted joint committee for reviewing the Constitution in January 2014, it will take considerable dominated political center realizes that an effective federal structure with agreements have unexpectedly-been signed with some of Naypitaw's fiercest ethnic adversaries, in particular the Shan and Karen (Kayin). In that respect, this new round of peace talks earlier policies successfully rebellions where earlier ceasefires had been rejected (Tin Maung Maung Than 2013). General Aung Min, with conducting negotiations with both the ethnic armed insurgencies and ceasefire groups. These new initiatives met with both the Shan State Army-South Karen National Union New Mon State Party (NMSP) remains much to minority in the country's north, for instance, illustrates the continuing interethnic mistrust. In June 2011, war broke out along the Chinese Aside from these interethnic tensions, the dramatic plight of the Rohingya minority, more generally Myanmar's Muslim communities, also remains unresolved. The Buddhist "969" movement in particular has drawn attention-and outcry-from the international community.

In March 2011, in response to escalating violence, a meeting of 12 armed ethnic groups, cease-fire groups and ethnic political groups took place in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where those present agreed to form a coalition, the Union Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The alliance included representatives from the Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Kachin, Lahu, Mon, Pa-O, Palaung, Shan and Wa groups (*Stephen McCarthy, Civil Society in Burma: From Military Rule to “Disciplined Democracy”, Regional Outlook Paper: No. 37, 2012, pp 11-12*). The UNFC agreed to establish four military regions in Myanmar; to share their resources if the Tatmadaw attacked any coalition member; and that no member would hold separate ceasefire talks with the Government.

The challenge is in designing mechanisms that systematically include civil society. In some cases, notably in Karen State, civil society consultations have taken place both inside the conflict area and along the Thai-Myanmar border. A combination of local civil society actors and international observers has played a key role in organizing and supporting these discussions. By including Karen who is not aligned with the KNU, these discussions helped to build broad confidence in the peace process. For its part, the Government has stressed the importance of such consultations. However, in other areas, those leading ethnic armed groups still need to be convinced of the benefits of more inclusive consultation and are fearful that civil society might contest their legitimacy as the primary representative of respective ethnic groups. Decision-making tends to be authoritarian within most of Myanmar’s armed groups (*Peacemaking in Myanmar, Oslo forum 2012-The Oslo forum Network of Mediators, pp 66*). The KNU has set an example which other armed groups would do well to emulate, although not all ethnic states have as well developed a civil society as exists in Karen State.

While lip service has been paid to the idea that democratization cannot be complete without resolution of ethnic conflict, in practice the latter has only recently become a high-profile issue on the reform agenda. This lack of dialogue and understanding between Myanmar and ethnic civil society is mirrored on a much larger scale in the relations between Myanmar and ethnic communities across the country. It is hardly likely that lasting peace will be achieved between ethnic minorities and the center if there is only minimal engagement between the ethnic majority and minorities, which speaks to the need for a longer .

## 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference

The 2016 Panglong Conference, officially known as the Union Peace Conference 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong is a peace conference which began on 31 August 2016 in Myanmar Convention Centre 2 of Naypyidaw, Myanmar. The conference was chaired by Lieutenant General Yar Pyae from Tatmadaw, Tin Myo Win from government, Shila Nan Taung from parliament, Khun Myint Tun from ethnic armed group and Myint Soe from political parties. Ethnic armed groups called for federal system that guarantees justice, equality, self-administration and protection of racial, religious and political rights of ethnic minorities ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016\\_Panglong\\_Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Panglong_Conference)). More than 1,400 people attended the first day of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference (<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aung-san-suu-kyi-begins-myanmar-peace-conference-on-hopeful-note-08312016160018.html>). The first Panglong Conference was held in the Panglong region of British Burma in 1947, and was negotiated between General Aung San and ethnic leaders. Despite several meetings between ethnic insurgent groups and the government prior to the Panglong Conference in 2016, it is unclear how many of them will actually attend. Eighteen ethnic insurgent groups are expected to attend the conference, whilst three ethnic insurgent groups (The Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army) are not expected to attend ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016\\_Panglong\\_Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Panglong_Conference)). Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations also attended the opening ceremony. United Wa State Army had left the conference saying they were allowed only as observer.

Though fresh fighting between armed ethnic groups and the Myanmar army in Kachin and Shan states have cast a pall over the conference, representatives from 17 other ethnic militias are attending the summit. Three other groups the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) were not invited to participate because they have refused to lay down their arms in advance of the talks. The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an alliance of nine ethnic armed groups that did not sign the NCA, are attending the conference to show their respect to and support of Aung San Suu Kyi and to advocate for a federal union in Myanmar (<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aung-san-suu-kyi-begins-myanmar-peace-conference-on-hopeful-note-8312016160018.html>). In other words, lasting peace will involve a fundamental restructuring of the state.

Should other ethnic regions gain more autonomy, predominantly Myanmar regions could begin to ask why they too should not benefit from their own elected Chief Ministers (*Peacemaking in Myanmar, Oslo forum 2012-The Oslo forum Network of Mediators, pp 67*). This argues for, perhaps, framing parts of the peace process as a process of decentralization nationwide.

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong therefore marks a historic step on the path to peace in Myanmar. But it is just a step; the beginning of a long and difficult peace process in which hard compromises will have to be made, and not just by the government. To succeed, all the parties will have to compromise in order to find common ground. The international community, meanwhile, would do well to furnish the government with every support and to significantly ramp up its commitment to peacebuilding(<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/08/myanmar-21st-century-panglong-aung-san-su-kyi>).The challenges are immense, but the fact that so much has already been achieved in the past five years gives hope that Myanmar's great potential for peace and prosperity might at last be within the grasp of its people .It is important, though, not to expect too much.

The Panglong Conference is the start of a process, not its conclusion. After decades of civil war, displacement, land seizures, discrimination, and poverty, the challenges facing Myanmar are both large-scale and complex. They are also interconnected and will require comprehensive peacebuilding solutions backed by the international community. The original Panglong Conference now enjoys something of a mythical status. It was an attempt by nationalist leader Aung San to win the loyalty of Myanmar's diverse ethnic groups in return for autonomy and self-rule. But it is worth remembering that the event actually failed to deliver an agreement. The parties to these events later differed in their interpretation of what had been agreed, and the terms were fairly ambiguous. For example, it was agreed that a Kachin state would be desirable but no specific provisions were made to achieve it; "full autonomy" was agreed "in principle" but there was little clarity on what that meant. Nonetheless, the Panglong Agreement provided the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic communities autonomy in return for their loyalty to the new state. In addition to its ambiguity, the Panglong deal also lacked inclusiveness. The Karen ethnic group, for example, was not formally included in the arrangements and attended the talks only as observers(<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/08/myanmar-21st-century-panglong-aung-san-su-kyi>).Some Karen later claimed that the departing British colonial powers had promised

them a separate state. Whether or not the Panglong could have established a framework for the peaceful unification of Myanmar will never be known.

### ***Internal Peace***

Thus far, the main disagreement between the KIO and the government regarding the sequencing of ceasefire agreement and political dialogue in which the KIO preferred to have political dialogue first remained unresolved and was holding back further substantive progress. On the other hand, the intransigence of the KIO and a small ethnic armed group who had yet to sign ceasefire agreements together with ambivalence among some ceasefire groups had repeatedly delayed the signing of the nationwide ceasefire accord envisaged by the government's leading negotiator U Aung Min (Vice Chair of UPWC) and the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC; a think tank-style support team for the government's peace initiative). The insistence by the UNFC to bargain collectively with emphasis on achieving political concessions before a ceasefire had been at odds with the UPWC's bilateral ceasefire negotiation approach and further complicated the peace process (*Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmar Security Outlook: Peace-making, Ceasefires, Communal Tensions and Politics, pp 40*). The Laiza meeting brought together a team of representatives from 12 ethnic armed groups which the government recognized as 'dialogue partners', and four other groups which are part of the UNFC. Although this first meeting between the government and the NCCT did not yield an agreement, both sides have now established a process to continue negotiating. The collective talk between the government and NCCT is another historic milestone, unprecedented in Myanmar's ethnic armed conflict (*Min Zaw Oo, Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements, 2014, pp 21*). It adopted a six-point road map and formed a Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team (NCCT) mandate to enter into dialogue with the government negotiating team on behalf of the 17 signatories (representatives of armed ethnic organizations) to the so-called "Laiza Agreement" (*Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmar Security Outlook: Peace-making, Ceasefires, Communal Tensions and Politics, pp 40*). The NCCT draws its membership and office bearers from the larger ceasefire groups and has spearheaded meetings with the MPC's Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC).

The agreement of ceasefires between the Myanmar government, and all of the main armed ethnic groups in the country, is a necessary and important milestone in peacemaking—but

not sufficient to achieve significant peace building. Since late 2011, the military-backed government has agreed preliminary ceasefires with 14 NSAGs. In a landmark talks between the government and the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) held at Chiang Mai on 20 February 2013, the government, perhaps for the first time, officially agreed to initiate a political dialogue with the ethnic after six decades of civil war (*Challenging the Reconciliation Process: Myanmar's Ethnic Divide and Conflicts, CS Kuppuswamy, pp 6*). The fact that ceasefires agreed with groups based in northern Myanmar (Kachin and Shan States) has been the most unstable is particularly worrying. Displaced populations fleeing conflict in the north are less likely to seek refuge across international borders, causing embarrassment for the Myanmar government unlike in Thailand, where the presence of aid agencies and activist groups would rapidly draw attention to the humanitarian impacts of fighting. It should also be noted that, in some cases at least, clashes have resulted from NSAG commanders on the ground patrolling aggressively, seeking taxation from villages and provoking Myanmar Army interventions. The continuation of fighting in several areas is clearly of great concern (*Myanmar in Transition: Polity, People and Processes, 2013, pp 69-70*). However, the middle and later part of 2013 seems have been characterized by less frequent clashes between NSAGs and government forces. Furthermore, in many areas, the ceasefire situation is relatively more stable.

The ethnic groups also appear to have a poor understanding of the evolution and politicization of ethnicity in Myanmar. Equally, they seem to misunderstand how federal governments work in practice and tend to mistakenly think that a federal arrangement will allow them to control territories and retain private armies. In the face of all these difficulties, a total of eight groups led by the KNU agreed to and then signed the NCA in October 2015 after an ethnic summit meeting in Chiangmai (*elevenmyanmar.com, October 2, 2015*). The seven groups are the KNU, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Arakan Liberation Party, the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Pa'o National Liberation Organization (PNLO), and the Revolutionary Council of the Shan States (RCSS) (*N. Ganesan, Ethnic Insurgency and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar, pp 281*)... A "joint-implementation coordination meeting" was subsequently held a day after the signing of the NCA. During that meeting a joint monitoring committee and a peace development committee were set up to ensure that the NCA succeeds.



The second difficulty is the ongoing unresolved conflict between the military and the KIA. Other groups involved in sporadic fighting include the RCSS and the TNLA. The MNDA's attack on government forces in Laukkaing in March 2015 and the TNLA and AA's support for it have also alienated them from the other groups. The TNLA has no peace agreement with the government, and the military is unwilling to accede to an agreement with the MNDA, the TNLA, and the AA. The three other groups with which it has no interest in signing agreements are the Wa National Organization, the Lahu Democratic Union, and the Arakan National Council. The large loss of life and face inflicted on them by the MNDA means that the military is committed to defeating the MNDA with armed force. The extension of the state of emergency imposed in Kokang in response to the March fighting effectively means that the military controls the area and the situation is not subject to civilian or political interference *N. Ganesan, E(ethnic Insurgency and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar, pp 283)*. In this regard, it should be remembered that the military is above civilian political control on issues of peace and security that threaten the state.

Ethnic armed groups raised a plethora of issues that they wanted the government to address during the ceasefire process prior to political dialogue. The current union-level ceasefire talks actually aims to build confidence among parties by addressing some concerns prior to political dialogue (*Min Zaw Oo, Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements, 2014, pp 21*). Union-level negotiations have been conducted through a tripartite structure of government, ethnic and third-party representatives. In this structure, the government, the *Tatmadaw* (Myanmar Defence Services), and the *Hluttaw* (Parliament) have been represented through the dual Union Peace-making Committees. These consist of an 11-member "Central Committee" (UPCC) chaired by President Thein Sein, and a 52-member "Working Committee" (UPWC) running the actual negotiations, headed by Vice-president Sai Mauk Kham and composed of largely regional-level representatives. U Aung Min is one of four vice-chairmen of the UPWC and also the government's chief negotiator. Around 21 EAOs have been in some way engaged in the NCA process. Four of these groups—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K), and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA-S)—were invited by the UPWC to participate in negotiations bilaterally, and although the RCSS/SSA-S has attended NCA meetings with the UNFC, these EAOs have chosen not to participate yet in the

NCA negotiations. The remaining organizations have either directly or indirectly participated in negotiations through membership in or close affiliation to either the 13-member United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), and/ or the loosely UNFC-based 16-member National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT). Over the course of negotiations the NCCT has effectively grown into the most prominent representative of EAO interests throughout the NCA negotiation process.

### **Myitson Dam Project**

Myitsone Dam is located 37 kilometers away from Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. The area is widely recognized for its ecological value and is described by prominent conservation organizations as one of the world's eight hotspots of biodiversity. The dam site is less than 100 kilometers from the earthquake prone Sagaing fault line. The Myitsone Hydro -electric Project is located at the confluence of the Mali and N'Mai rivers and is the largest of seven dams (total capacity 13,360 MW) planned along the Ayeyarwady, Mali Hka, and N'Mai Hka rivers in Myanmar. The 152-meter tall Myitsone Dam was dubbed as 'China's Overseas Three Gorges Dam'. It is not only because of the scale of the project, but also 90% of electricity generated will be transmitted to China. The negotiation of the Myitsone Dam began in 2006. After the completion of feasibility test and the environmental impact assessment (EIA), the agreement was signed during then Chinese Vice-President (current President) Xi Jinping's visit to Naypyidaw in December 2009. Upstream Ayeyarwady Confluence Basin Hydropower Co. Ltd. was formed subsequently. In the joint venture, the state-owned China Power Investment (CPI) controls 80% of the shares, while Myanmar's MOEP-1 and Asia World Company hold 15% and 5% of the shares respectively. Scheduled for completion in 2019, Myitsone will become the 15<sup>th</sup> largest hydropower station in the world, with installed capacity at 6,000 MW.

Kachin residents lived in the Myitsone area were deeply worried about the adverse impacts of the project. The size of dam's reservoir would be 766 km<sup>2</sup>, slightly bigger than Singapore's territory. Homeland and livelihood of 18,000 people from 47 villages would be inundated by the project. The Ayeyarwady River is the longest river in Myanmar that flows from Northern Kachin State, passes through Mandalay, Magway, Bago and Ayeyarwady divisions before entering into the Andaman Sea. The catchment area is as much as 46,000 km<sup>2</sup>. It is always regarded as the birthplace of civilization of Myanmar. Several kingdoms have had their capital in Bagan, Tharakhittara, Amarapura and Mandalay along the Ayeyarwady River. Over the

centuries, the river has been the inspiration for stories, poems and songs. In terms of economy, the river is an important commercial waterway in the country. And it provides livelihoods for farmers and fishermen who live along the river. Disregarding the actual environmental and social impacts of the dam, people's affection towards the Ayeyarwady was the root cause of opposition. Damming on the Ayeyarwady would seriously damage the history, culture, and even national identity of people in Myanmar.

The state newspaper *New Light of Myanmar* reported that 2,146 people from 410 households and five villages will move into in model villages, which are equipped with wooden houses, schools, a police station, a hospital, a post office, and religious buildings, and will be supplied with water and electric power. However, Aung San Suu Kyi explained in her Ayeyarwady . Appeal that 12,000 people from 63 villages have already been relocated and it is not clear whether they will ever receive compensation. A total of 20,000 people are to be affected by the dam cascade overall. To solve the problem of how the displaced people would make their living, the company directly disbursed to displaced people compensation of about 4 billion kyat for orchards and economically useful woodland, as well as an allowance for living expenses, a grain ration, 21-inch color TVs, and appropriate everyday living necessities.

### **Letpadaung Copper Mining Project**

Letpadaung Copper Mining Project is located in Salingyi Township of Sagaing Region, Central Myanmar. The project is Myanmar's largest mine and consists of four mine deposits: Sabetaung, Sabetaung South, Kyisintaung and Letpadaung. The first three have been developed as one project called S & K project. Letpadaung mine site is approximately 6 km far from southeast of the Sabetaung and Kyisintaung mine site. The Letpadaung Mine site is under the jurisdiction of Salingyi Township. The Salingyi Township constitutes 3 Quarters, 39 Village Tracts and 152 Villages and has a population of approximately 190,000 people (*Lwin Lwin Wai, Public Participation, Social Movements and Environmental Decision Making: A case study of Latpadaung Mining Project, pp 18*). The Project is approximately 4.5 km to the south west of Monywa, a regional town located 110 km west of Mandalay, the economic centre of central Myanmar, and 722 km north of Yangon. Travel to Monywa from the Project site can be undertaken by road or by river transport. From Monywa, ongoing travel and transport can be undertaken by road, rail and air. The Project site is located around the geographic location 22°04' N, 95°05' E and occupies an area of 32.73 km<sup>2</sup> (*environment and social impact*

*Assessment, pp 2*). It is approximately 13 km south of the mine site. The ethnic majority living in the area is Bamar. They have rural lifestyle and their main economic activity is farming. Copper mine of Monywa is one of major mines in Myanmar .

The Letpadaung Copper Mine project is a joint venture between Wanbao Mining, a subsidiary of China's state-owned China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEHL), with a total estimated investment of \$1.065 billion. The agreement was finalized 3 June 2010 during then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Myanmar (*Chines Investment in Myanmar: What Lies Ahead?, pp 5*). Letpadaung is a large mine project operated by the Wanbao Mining Copper Ltd. company, in cooperation with the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEHL) Wanbao, a subsidiary of China North Industries Group Corp. or Norinco, a large arms manufacturer, bought the project from Ivanhoe, a Canadian mining company in 2011. Ivanhoe had won the initial project from the Myanmar government pursuant to a series of agreements and feasibility studies from 1994 to 1996. The joint venture agreement was signed on April 10, 1996. Ivanhoe divested its share of the project in 2011, citing the impact of the negative stigma of working with the military government on its other business throughout the world. The final agreement with Wanbao, reached after protests in 2012, gave it a 30% share of the eventual profits, 19% going to UMEHL, a massive military-owned company and 51% to Myanmar's government. A later agreement gave 2% of profits to local development. The project is reported to have cost approximately \$1 billion to develop.

Through its decades of economic isolation resulting from Western sanctions, Myanmar found China a critical ally and investment partner. However the large projects undertaken with China often served to exacerbate anti-China sentiment in the country, which has always had a contentious relationship with its northern neighbor. Though a substantial ethnic-Chinese population has long been a part of Myanmar's demographic landscape, an influx of Chinese immigrants with business connections in Northern Myanmar over the past 20 years has caused tensions and anti-Chinese feelings to rise ([www.https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Letpadaung-Copper\\_Mine](https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Letpadaung-Copper_Mine) They made four demands: to suspend temporarily dumping waste soil, to stop constructing company buildings, to reopen monastery of Wet-Hmay village that sealed on December 2011 and not to remove households remained in Wet-Hmay , Sae-tae and Zee-taw villages (*Express Times Journal, 11 September 2012*). As a result Mine Company have temporarily suspended for 2 months and seventeen days.

On 21 August 2012 Company restarted work without any consultation on villagers' demands. Yangon civil society organizations that support the Letpadaung area arrived in local community in August 2012. Among them some are political prisoners. The civil society groups went around project-affected villages near the Letpadaung area and stimulated the farmers to think about land grab issue. It spread widely among project-affected area. Soon after farmers and activists erected signboard "No encroaching onto village-owned farmland". From this, the activists and local residents made a lot of social movements together. After that thousands of local villagers and monks participated in the protest demonstration. The protest was supported by the civil society organizations from Yangon, Mandalay and Monywa; environmental groups and political groups. The protests got a lot of attention in local and international media. Mandalay-based and Yangon-based Environmental Organizations have joined together in Letpadaung crisis by conducting the public talk about the social and environmental impacts; and requirements of EIA, SIA and International Standards (*Lwin Lwin Wai, Public Participation, Social Movements and Environmental Decision Making: A case study of Latpadaung Mining Project, pp 21*). The environmental impacts concerning dust pollution and soil damage due to past Sabaetaung and Kyisintaung mining practice were of concern to local people .

### **Conclusions**

In fact, whether democratization succeeds or failure depend on a lot of factors, one of them is preconditions of democracy. That means that social, economic and cultural preconditions make democratization more likely, Economic development is crucial to countries which are democratic transition. Democracy is not just a political system sustained by elections and the free participation of alive by a set of societal and cultural values, or "democratic ethos." Ethnic conflicts and economic underdevelopment, and with decade-long authoritarianism led by a "guardian "military, a low-quality bureaucracy, and a few oligarchies, democratic commitments will be difficult to sustain in the institutionalization of the Burmese state cannot be accomplished if the post=SPDC civil structures and agencies remain too dependent on a handful other countries through the personification of power remains a deeply rooted phenomenon in a Burmese society structured around a round patron/client networks. If this trend were inevitable resistance to change has indeed already emerged and may gradually impede the institutionalization of a stable democratic government and, therefore, additional reforms and wider democratic change in Myanmar. It will not, however, necessarily come from active military personnel, even though

observers still fear the army might organize another coup d'etal in the near future to better protect the military reserve domains.

The adoption of constitutional amendments to ensure more devolution of power before 2015 would certainly appease ethnic-movements and minority. Constitutional reforms should also be engaged to strengthen the mandate of the legislature: a clearer separation of power and more autonomy for the local Hluttaws, along with consolidated mechanisms for the scrutiny of the central executive's activities its appointed representatives in Parliament) and more transparency in standing parliamentary committees as well as in ministries where bureaucrats prepare drafts alone and from the top with little public consultation of experienced parliamentarians and bureaucrats remaining in office, from one election to the next, so as not to rely only on a few charismatic political figures. In all, raising the performance and strengthening the institutionalization of h legislative branch is essential in a post-authoritarian society executive branch traditionally tends to concentrate.

Lastly, in order reinforce the post-SPDC state institutions, political behavior and public mentalities have to fundamentally change in the country, especially among the ruling elites including civilian ones. Active and mature citizens need to be trained, educated, and encouraged to constructively intervene in politics-and not only to stand as "opponents." People must be more broadly involved in state policymaking in a position to propose a new political vision of how to build a new the checks and balances on their political leaders-the army, the government, the parliamentarians. This needs to be done in constructive ways and only by blindly following a few iconic leaders and looking for their guidance. The peace-making process in Myanmar is the complex and lengthy process which includes multilayer negotiations. Peace is the essential foundations for social progress and sustainable development and it also critical for ending human suffering and achieving stability. Most importantly peace is essential for implementing a stable and democratic state. Since the 1990's, the Myanmar government initiated ceasefire negotiations with many ethnic armed groups. The Myanmar government is currently trying to negotiate several issues with all ethnic minorities. In doing so, people can help to build a more inclusive, more tolerant, more just and more peaceful Myanmar nation-state. The broader international context within which states operate including prevailing international norms, legal regimes, economic and strategic interests profoundly influences the nature and duration of conflicts and

the likelihood that suitable transitional justice mechanism will be set in motion once they have ended. Otherwise, whatever other factors may be at play, a permissive international environment can accelerate or even give to patterns of conflict, violence of human right abuses. At the same time, international actors including states, INGOs like UN, civil society groups can be pivotal in bringing healthy criticism even as the state embarks on a process of reforms by being a source for new ideas and solutions by facilitating dialogue among conflicting partners. Both the Myanmar government and all ethnic armed groups must be tried to bring peace for the country to be a genuine federal democratic union.

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